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LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN EXPANDING
THE SCOPE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
DNA DATA BANKS*
Mark A. Rothsteint & Sandra Carnahan'
INTRODUCTION
Modern DNA identification techniques were developed
in the United Kingdom in the mid-1980s, and were originally
used in criminal investigations. It was not long before U.S.
courts in criminal cases permitted expert testimony about the
probability of a match between a defendant's DNA and DNA
obtained from blood, semen, and other biological materials left
at a crime scene.2 Within a mere decade of its first appearance
in court, virtually every jurisdiction in the United States had
held that DNA identification evidence was admissible.3
When DNA evidence proved valuable in determining a
match between DNA specimens left at a crime scene and DNA
from suspects in custody, the next logical use of DNA
identification was to link crime scene evidence with the DNA of
individuals who were not yet suspected in the crimes. Indeed,
DNA identification technology was initially used to find a
serial rapist from among the population of three Leicestershire
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2 See Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (affirming
conviction in first reported U.S. case to admit DNA identification evidence).
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villages in England.4 In the United States, to facilitate
suspicionless identification, or what has become known as "cold
hits," it was necessary to develop a repository of DNA samples
from known individuals with which crime scene evidence could
be compared.5
After Congress appropriated funds to develop both a
federal system run by the FBI and state systems,6 every state
enacted the necessary enabling legislation to develop a linked
system of DNA data banks.7 The original state laws were not
identical in scope, but generally mandated that individuals
convicted of sex offenses and a few other violent felonies, such
as murder, were required to submit samples to the state for
DNA analysis and storage in the state law enforcement data
bank.' Individuals convicted of sex offenses and other violent
felonies were required to have their DNA analyzed because
these crimes are often committed by recidivists, and the
perpetrators are especially likely to leave DNA evidence at the
crime scene.
The DNA data banks proved to be such a powerful law
enforcement tool that within a few years many states amended
their laws to expand the categories of crimes from which DNA
samples were required.9 In many cases, the crimes bore little
relationship to the initial justifications." Instead, it was
asserted that perpetrators of less violent personal and property
crimes, if not apprehended, would be likely to commit other,
more violent crimes. Legal challenges to the state laws, even
those with broader scope, were uniformly unsuccessful,1 thus
4 See generally JOSEPH WAMBAUGH, THE BLOODING (1989).
5 The other main alternative, mass sweeps or screens, are of less value in a
large, mobile population and may raise serious constitutional questions. Cf Davis v.
Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (rounding up and fingerprinting twenty-four black
males after rape victim told police that her assailant was a black male violated the
Fourth Amendment).
6 42 U.S.C. § 1370 (1999) (appropriating $20 million for the federal system and
$40 million for the states).
7 See infra Appendix, Tbl. 1.
8See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.170 (Michie 2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-
10-403 (2000).
9 See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 29-16-3, -6 (Michie 2000); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995
(McKinney 2000).
10 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 36-18-24, 13A-9-91 (2000) (illegal possession of food
stamps); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-10-71, 24-4-60 (2000) (false swearing); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§§ 6-2-402, 7-19-403 (Michie 2000) (blackmail).
11 See infra notes 79-94 and accompanying text.
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encouraging the notion that more comprehensive data banks
are legally and socially acceptable.
It is understandable that some well-meaning public
officials and legal scholars have advocated obtaining DNA
samples from all individuals arrested for certain crimes or for
any crime.1 2 Inevitably, there will be calls for a universal DNA
law enforcement data bank with samples from every resident
of the country.13 Technically, this would be a massive but
possible undertaking, and it might involve, for example, the
use of newborn screening samples, and samples taken upon
entry in school, application for a driver's license, or government
benefits such as Social Security. In other countries, including
the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and Germany, mass
genetic sweeps (such as testing all adult males in a certain
geographical area) have been used to solve crimes, although
general data bases have not been established.14 DNA data
banks of increasingly broad scope would help to solve more
crimes, 5 but at what cost to civil liberties?
Part I of this Article reviews the federal and state legal
authority to establish DNA data banks for law enforcement. It
then considers the constitutional arguments, primarily
unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment, that have been raised in challenging existing
laws. Because the Supreme Court has not yet decided any
cases dealing with this precise issue, and because prior cases
12 See Jayson Blair, Police Chiefs Join in Call for More DNA Sampling, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1999, at B-5 (quoting N.Y. City Police Commissioner Howard Safir);
Laylan Copelin, Allow DNA Samples at Arrests, Officials Urge; Police Chief DA Seek,
AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, June 9, 2000, at Al (reporting the views of Austin
Police Chief Stan Knee and Travis County (Tex.) District Attorney Ronnie Earle).
'3 See Akhil Reed Amar, A Safe Intrusion, AM. LAW., June, 2001, at 69
(advocating establishing DNA data bank for all citizens, but including some of the
precautions suggested in this article, such as destruction of samples after analysis and
analyzing only non-coding regions of the genome). See also UK Police Chief Calls for a
National DNA Database, 400 NATURE 106 (1998). But see Teresa Y. Baumann, Note,
Proxy Consent and a National DNA Databank: An Unethical and Discriminatory
Combination, 86 IOWA L. REV. 667, 675 (2001) (opposing national DNA data bank).
4 Jonathan Kimmelman, Risking Ethical Insolvency: A Survey of Trends in
Criminal DNA Databanking, 28 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 209, 213 (2000).
'5 This is certainly the assumption underlying the enactment of increasingly
broad state laws and proposals to extend the scope of law enforcement DNA data
banks. There is a dearth of empirical evidence, however, about the expected law
enforcement benefits of ever-greater incursions into the privacy of greater numbers of
individuals.
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would support arguments upholding as well as striking down
broader data banks, the outcome of a court challenge to a
broader data bank law must be viewed as unclear at this time.
It is possible that a law establishing a broad DNA law
enforcement data bank might be held constitutional even
though it went beyond what is necessary or desirable.
Therefore, Part II considers the policy issues at stake in DNA
data banks. Besides the issue of from whom samples should be
required, in this section we consider other significant issues,
such as whether the samples should be destroyed after
analysis or retained indefinitely, for what lawful purposes
should the data be used, and whether current laws contain
adequate sanctions for the improper use of the data.
The Article concludes that regardless of the
constitutionality of broader data banks, public policy demands
that only the DNA of convicted sex offenders and violent felons
should be collected. The analytical methods should utilize
technology that will disclose information useful only in
identification and not in assessing current or predictive health
status. Furthermore, once analyzed, the samples should be
destroyed, thereby assuring the public that the samples cannot
be reanalyzed for any other purpose.
I. LEGAL ISSUES
A. The Legal Authority to Test
The federal Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 199416 authorized the FBI to create a
national data base of DNA samples taken from convicted
offenders, crime scenes and victims of crimes, and unidentified
human remains. As a result, the FBI established the Combined
DNA Index System ("CODIS"), which had been in development
as a pilot program since the early 1990s." The 1994 law also
16 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (1999).
17 The FBI's CODIS system was started in 1989. Randall S. Murch & Bruce
Budowle, Are Developments in Forensic Applications of DNA Technology Consistent
with Privacy Protections?, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 212, 220 (Mark A. Rothstein ed. 1997).
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provided the funds for states to develop their DNA forensic
capabilities, and the CODIS system allows state and local
forensics laboratories to exchange and compare DNA profiles
electronically, thereby creating a national DNA forensic
system.18
The CODIS system is organized into four data bases: (1)
convicted offenders, whose samples are taken upon conviction,
incarceration, or release; (2) unsolved cases, which contains
biological crime scene evidence; (3) missing persons data base,
which contains both unidentified remains and profiles of
parents of missing children; and (4) populations data base,
which compiles the frequency of certain genetic markers among
various populations. 9 Entry into the system is restricted to
specified crime laboratories, and security is further protected
with the use of password access and encryption.0
All fifty states have enacted laws requiring convicted
offenders to provide DNA samples for analysis and entry into
the CODIS system.1 Subsequent federal legislation also
permitted the FBI to take DNA samples from individuals
convicted of federal crimes of violence, robbery, and burglary,
or similar crimes in the District of Columbia, or while in the
military, and authorizing the information derived from the
samples to be included in the CODIS system.22
Despite being less than a decade old, many of the state
laws authorizing the collection of DNA samples have been
amended to expand the list of individuals from whom samples
are required. As detailed in the Appendix, Table 1, as of
January 2001, the categories of offenses and the number of
states requiring samples from the individuals committing them
is as follows: sex offenses (51); offenses against children (50);
murder (42); assault and battery (35); juvenile delinquency
(24); robbery (24); burglary (24); all felonies or violent felonies
(12). Three states have enacted laws providing for the
collection of DNA samples from individuals merely arrested for
certain crimes, although South Dakota's law was later
is 42 U.S.C. §14135 (1999).
19 42 U.S.C. §14132 (1999).
20 42 U.S.C. §14131 (1999).
21 See infra Appendix, Tbl 1.
2DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-580, 114
Stat. 2726 (Dec. 29, 2000).
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amended to apply only to individuals who have been
convicted.' Louisiana's law authorizes the DNA testing and
data banking of individuals arrested for felony sex offenses and
other specified crimes.24 California's law authorizes the DNA
testing of "a suspect" for murder, voluntary manslaughter,
felony spousal abuse, sexual assault of a child, kidnapping,
mayhem, and torture.25 The clear trend is to expand the
categories of individuals from whom DNA samples are
required."
B. Legal Challenges
State and federal DNA data banks have been
challenged under a variety of circumstances and legal theories.
The context for the challenges include the denial of good
conduct time to prisoners who refuse to submit a DNA
sample," the use of force to obtain a DNA sample over the
objection of a prisoner,28 conditioning parole on submitting a
DNA sample,29 and using a sample as evidence in a subsequent
criminal case.0 The context for the challenge has not had any
effect on the constitutional analysis used by the courts.
Therefore, the merits of the various arguments will be
discussed without a detailed discussion of the factual claims
underlying the challenges.
S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 23-5-14 (Michie Supp. 1999) (deleting earlier provision
permitting DNA testing of arrestees).
24 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.609 (West 1999).
2' CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 296, 296.1, 297, 298, 299, 299.5 (West 2001). "A
suspect" is defined as "a person against whom an information or indictment has been
filed for one of the crimes listed .... A person shall remain a suspect for two years
from the date of the filing of the information or indictment or until the DNA laboratory
receives notification that the person has been acquitted or the charges dismissed." Id.
at § 297 (B)(3).
26 In 2000, nineteen states considered bills to expand the categories of
offenders from whom DNA samples are required and eight states enacted legislation.
In 2001, 110 bills have been introduced in thirty-five states to include more offenders,
and it is estimated that twenty-two states will enact legislation. Tim Schellberg, DNA
Database Expansion in the 2001 State Legislatures (Presentation at the National
Institute of Justice's Second Annual Grantees' Workshop June 8, 2001).
27 See Ewell v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482 (4th Cir. 1993).
See Sanders v. Coman, 864 F. Supp. 496 (E.D.N.C. 1994).
29 See Dial v. Vaughn, 733 A.2d 1 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999).
30 See Johnson v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769 (Va.) cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
432 (2000).
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The DNA data bank statutes have been challenged on
several federal and state constitutional grounds. State
constitutional arguments have generally tracked the federal
arguments and neither have met with any success. The most
important argument is that DNA data bank laws are
unconstitutional because they amount to an unreasonable
search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
1. Unreasonable Search and Seizure
The most frequently raised argument, and the most
substantial one, is that obtaining a DNA sample and using the
genetic information derived from the sample constitutes an
unreasonable search and seizure. The Fourth Amendment of
the United States Constitution prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures31 and applies to the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment.32 Although nonconsensual searches
conducted outside the judicial process are per se
unreasonable,33 nothing in the Fourth Amendment expressly
prohibits government searches without a warrant. The Fourth
Amendment prohibits only searches that are unreasonable.34
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment as
establishing rules and presumptions that limit the
government's ability to intrude upon matters of personal
privacy.35 The scope of its protections are broad, encompassing
searches by police, school officials, government employers, and
others. The Supreme Court has applied the Fourth
Amendment in circumstances ranging from border searches
and DWI and narcotics checkpoints, to police surveillance
3'U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
32U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 provides that no State shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
33 See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963).
34 See Illinois v. McArthur, 121 S. Ct. 946, 949 (2001) (citing Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983)).3
' See McArthur, 121 S. Ct. at 949.
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techniques and, most recently, to a hospital's sharing with law
enforcement the drug screens of its maternity patients.36
CODIS implicates the Fourth Amendment because the
bodily intrusion required to obtain DNA from a convicted
offender constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.
This section first examines how courts have viewed physically
intrusive searches within the traditional Fourth Amendment
context, which requires some level of individualized suspicion
of wrongdoing. Next, this section examines circumstances
under which courts have allowed physically intrusive searches
absent individualized suspicion after balancing the degree of
intrusion upon personal privacy against the government
interest at stake, and includes a discussion of the balancing
test as applied in the DNA data bank cases. A few courts have
compared DNA sampling to the fingerprinting process, which
may not trigger Fourth Amendment analysis at all. That
viewpoint is presented here as well, as are other constitutional
claims that have been raised in the DNA data bank cases.
a. Bodily Intrusion in the Fourth Amendment Context
Where the Supreme Court has condoned government
infringement upon bodily integrity, it has done so either
because police possessed some degree of individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing or because the search was justifiable
as an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant
requirement. Early cases held that the Fourth Amendment
was implicated only upon a physical trespass of tangible
property, under the theory that superior property interests
controlled the right of the individual to prevent government
searches." Later cases extended Fourth Amendment protection
to items seized without technical trespass.38 Then, in the
landmark case of Katz v. United States, 39 the Court explained
that although what a person chooses to expose to the public
36 See generally Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001).
37 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464-66 (1928) (holding there
was no constitutional violation without physical trespass of person or property).
38 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (deciding that oral
statements overheard without technical trespass was a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment).
39 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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has no Fourth Amendment protection, those things that a
person seeks to preserve as private are constitutionally
protected.4" The Katz standard requires that a person have a
subjective expectation of privacy and that this expectation be
one that society would recognize as reasonable.41 Under this
standard, the government may compel handwriting or voice
exemplars without implicating the Fourth Amendment because
one has no reasonable expectation of privacy in one's
handwriting or voice, since both are constantly exposed to the
public.
42
When a government intrusion goes beyond the physical
characteristics exposed to the public, it constitutes a search
subject to constitutional scrutiny. Even when the intrusion is
minimal, some level of individualized suspicion is required. For
example, the Supreme Court, in Davis v. Mississippi,' noted
that the fingerprinting process "involves none of the probing
into an individual's private life and thoughts that marks an
interrogation or search."" Nonetheless, the Court held that the
police violated the Fourth Amendment when they illegally
detained a person without probable cause in order to take his
fingerprints.45 The Court noted in dictum, however, that in
"narrowly defined circumstances" it may be reasonable to
compel fingerprints on something less than probable cause.46
41 Id. at 352.
41 See id. at 361. (Harlan, J., concurring); See, e.g., California v. Greenwood,
486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986); Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984).
42 See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14 (1973) (holding that voice
exemplar compelled by grand jury was not constitutionally protected because
appearance before a grand jury was not a seizure, but a historical obligation, and a
person has no reasonable expectation that others will not know the sound of a voice
that is exposed to the public at large); see also United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 21
(1973) (stating that no showing of reasonableness is required to compel handwriting
because there is no expectation of privacy in its physical characteristics).
43 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
"" Id. at 727.4 1 Id. at 728.
4G Id. at 727. Fingerprinting is frequently cited as an analogous technology that
is widely accepted as unintrusive and highly accurate. Yet, the accuracy of
fingerprinting has increasingly come under attack. See Andy Newman,
Fingerprinting's Reliability Draws Growing Court Challenges, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7,
2001, at A7.
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Under traditional Fourth Amendment analysis, when
the government wishes to intrude below the surface of the skin,
or into an area where the expectation of privacy is great, at a
minimum, probable cause is required. The Supreme Court has
held that where police had probable cause to believe a suspect
committed a murder, it was constitutionally reasonable to take
fingernail scrapings from the suspect as evidence of the
murder.47  The Court noted, however, that unlike the
fingerprinting in Davis, searching under one's fingernails goes
beyond physical characteristics that are exposed to the public,
and constitutes the "severe, though brief intrusion upon
cherished personal security that is subject to constitutional
scrutiny."'5
Courts typically interpret the Fourth Amendment to
require a warrant where bodily intrusion is involved. One court
held a warrant was required to swab the inside of a suspect's
mouth to obtain a saliva sample.49 The court reasoned that
one's saliva contains a significant amount of private genetic
identity information, and saliva is not an item generally
exposed to the public, even though the act of expectorating is
somewhat commonplace.50 Swabbing the inside of a person's
mouth with a pad to obtain the saliva, the court noted,
implicates one's dignity interest; thus, a warrant was required
to obtain the sample.5 On the other hand, one state supreme
court reasoned that by talking and yawning, the inside of the
mouth was exposed to public view, and that swabbing the
inside of the mouth was less intrusive than piercing the skin to
draw blood.52 Still, this court required the lesser standard of
reasonable suspicion to support an order compelling a suspect
to submit to the collection of cheek epithelial cells by swabbing
the inside of his mouth.5
3
47 Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291, 296 (1973) (taking fingernail scrapings was
reasonable where police had probable cause to believe the suspect committed a murder,
the scrapings would reveal the perpetrator, the suspect was already voluntarily at the
station house, and the evidence was subject to destruction).
48 Id. at 295 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1968)).
49 See United States v. Nicolosi, 885 F. Supp. 50, 51 (E.D.N.Y 1995).
50 See id. at 55.
51 See id. at 55-56.
52 See In re Nontestimonial Identification Order Directed to R.H., 762 A.2d
1239, 1244 (Vt. 2000) [hereinafter Nontestimonial Identification].
53 See id.
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Certainly, privacy interests are implicated when skin is
pierced for the compulsory administration of a blood test, and a
warrant is required in the absence of exigent circumstances.'
When bodily fluids undergo chemical analysis to obtain
physiological data, a further intrusion upon privacy interests
occurs." Bodily integrity concerns also arise when one is
compelled to expel "alveolar or 'deep lung' breath for chemical
analysis."
5 6
Courts consider intrusions that implicate privacy and
dignity interests to be searches implicating Fourth Amendment
protections, even when the skin is not pierced. For example,
courts hold that a showing of probable cause is required to
compel a pubic hair sample, because the search involves an
area of the body traditionally concealed from public view as a
matter of personal privacy. 7 Similarly, the Supreme Court has
described the privacy interests inherent in a compelled urine
sample as a "host of private medical facts ... which might be
revealed by the chemical analysis of the sample fluid, as well
as a process of collecting such a sample which may involve
visual or aural monitoring of the act of urination. .... 58
Some government searches may be so physically
intrusive as to be unreasonable even when the government has
probable cause. In Winston v. Lee,59 the Court held that an
arrestee's privacy interest in avoiding surgery to remove a
bullet from his collarbone outweighed the state's interest in
recovering the bullet to use as evidence of his guilt. The Court
found that a potential danger from exposure to general
anesthesia existed, and the government had sufficient
evidence of guilt to prosecute the arrestee without the bullet."
See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
SId. at 616-17.
See Nontestimonial Identification, 762 A.2d at 1241 (citing State v. Towne,
615 A 2d 484, 492 (1992)).
58 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
M 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
60 See id. at 765-66.
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b. Exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's Warrant
Requirement: The Balancing Test
In certain narrowly-defined circumstances, the Supreme
Court has authorized searches in the absence of individualized
suspicion of wrongdoing, even when bodily intrusion is
involved. The Court has held that the government need not
have individualized suspicion of wrongdoing when the balance
of interests weighs in the government's favor. Courts must
balance the degree of intrusion upon an individual's privacy
against the government interest at stake.61 These searches are
usually, but not always, conducted by officials other than the
police, in situations where the government's purpose would be
frustrated by requiring probable cause. Furthermore, these
cases differ from those involving traditional law enforcement
activity in that the search is for evidence for administrative or
regulatory purposes, rather than aimed at the discovery of a
specific crime; 2 thus, the typical warrant and probable cause
requirements are relaxed.
The Supreme Court has applied the balancing test in a
wide range of circumstances, including housing safety
inspections,63 inspections of closely regulated businesses,"
various checkpoint inspections,65 school disciplinary searches,6
61 The origin of the balancing test can be traced to Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523 (1967). In that case, the Court held that a Department of Public Health
inspector could inspect an apartment for housing code violations without a warrant. In
carving out an exception to the warrant requirement, the Court stated: "ITihere can be
no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to
search against the invasion which the search entails." Id. at 536-37.62 Id. The Camara Court found the warrantless housing inspection reasonable
where the result could not be achieved any other way, and the neutral inspection plan
was "neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime ....
Id.
63 See id.
See, e.g., United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972) (upholding
warrantless entrance to gun store to inspect documents and gun licenses).
65 See, e.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 453 (1990)
(discussing a sobriety checkpoint); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653-54 (1979)
(suggesting that roadblock for purpose of vehicle license and registration check is
constitutional if according to policy that eliminates individual officer discretion);
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 566-67 (1976) (involving a checkpoint
to detect and deter flow of illegal immigrants); see also United States v. Lopez, 328 F.
Supp. 1077, 1092 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) (discussing airport passenger screening); see
generally CHARLES WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§13.06 (2000).
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workplace investigations, 7 and probation supervision. 8 Certain
cases characterize the government interest as one of "special
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement." 9 Perhaps
the most often cited "special needs" case is Skinner v. Railway
Labor Executives' Association.0
I In Skinner, the Court recognized the government's
"special need" to protect the public from railroad employees
who may be under the influence of drugs or alcohol during
their work hours. The Court upheld federal regulations
requiring that railroad officials collect blood, breath, and urine
from employees involved in railway accidents, for drug and
alcohol testing, without a warrant, without probable cause, and
without individualized suspicion. 1 The Court explained that
the purpose of the regulation requiring the testing was not to
assist in the prosecution of employees, but rather to further the
government's special need to investigate railroad accidents and
to prevent injuries that could result if employees were
impaired by drugs or alcohol 2 Under these circumstances, the
Court reasoned, requiring a warrant would not provide
protection against arbitrary and random government acts
because the standardized testing regulations themselves left no
facts for a neutral magistrate to evaluate. The Court stated
"1 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339-40 (1985).
6See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 620 (taking blood urine and breath tests
of employees for public safety purposes); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) (using urine testing of U.S. Customs employees to deter drug
use among officers); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719-20 (1987) (conducting
workplace search for evidence of non-criminal conduct).
68 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 872-73 (1987) (upholding warrantless
search of probationer's home by probation officer upon reasonable grounds to believe
probation violated).
69 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 489 U.S. at 665 ("Our cases establish that
where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy
expectations against the Government's interests to determine whether it is impractical
to require a warrant. .. ").
The term "special needs" is most often attributed to Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion in T.L.O. where he stated: "Only in those exceptional circumstances
in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant
and probable cause requirement impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its
balancing interests [for the warrant requirement]." T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352 (Blackmun,
J. concurring).
70 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
71 See id. at 613.
72 See id. at 620-21.
73 See id. at 621-24.
2001]
BROOKLYN LAWREVIEW
that "where the privacy interests implicated by the search are
minimal, and where an important government interest
furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a
requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be
reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion."74
The "special needs" doctrine was further articulated in a
companion case to Skinner in National Treasury Employees
Union v. Von Raab." Von Raab involved the collection of urine
specimens from U.S. Customs Service employees to check for
drug use, without a warrant or individualized suspicion.76 The
"special need" of the government in this case was to assure that
the Customs officers, who were responsible for confiscating
illegal drugs, were not themselves using drugs.77 The Court
explained that the government need was greater than the
normal needs of law enforcement because the purpose was to
deter drug use among officers seeking promotion to certain
sensitive positions, and not to prosecute employees for a
particular crime."
(1) Intrusiveness of the Search: The Data Bank Cases
Government infringement on genetic or informational
privacy has been virtually ignored by courts addressing the
constitutionality of state law enforcement DNA statutes.79 Most
courts conclude that the actual physical intrusion is minimal
and convicted offenders already have reduced general privacy
rights due to their offender status.
In judging the degree of intrusiveness, courts examine
the nature of the search and the circumstances surrounding
the search and seizure." Most courts rely on the Supreme
Court's analysis of bodily intrusion in the law enforcement
' Id. at 624.
75 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
76 See id. at 665-72.
77 See id. at 671, 672, 679.
78 See id. at 679.
79 The dissent in Dial v. Vaughn, 733 A.2d 1, 11 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999), notes
that "once scientists are able to map human DNA, DNA samples will reveal everything
about a person, including race, appearance, and predisposition to disease .... The
majority does not consider this potential expansive intrusion into a prisoner's privacy
from DNA testing, but I cannot ignore it."
"0 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633.
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context presented in Schmerber v. State of California"' in
finding that a blood test presents only a minimal intrusion.2
The Court, in Schmerber, held that it was reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment to take blood involuntarily from a
suspected drunk driver at the emergency room of a hospital. 3
In analyzing the degree of intrusiveness, the Court noted that
blood tests have become routinely required of one entering the
military service or applying for a marriage license.' Moreover,
the Court noted that millions of people voluntarily become
blood donors." In addition, when the blood is taken by a
physician in a hospital environment, and according to
"accepted medical practices," courts have found the
circumstances of the search and seizure are reasonable under
the Fourth Amendment.8 Several courts also cite the Supreme
Court's decision in Winston v. Lee,87 for the proposition that
"blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition
on an individual's personal privacy and bodily integrity."8 One
court, without analysis, found that only minimal bodily
intrusion was required where a DNA saliva sample was
obtained by rubbing the inside of the cheeks with a sponge on a
toothbrush-like handle for approximately fifteen seconds.8 '
Another court stated that, given the procedural safeguards in
the state statute, which limit analysis to identification, a DNA
blood test is more like a fingerprint or voice exemplar because
it involves "none of the probing into an individual's life and
thoughts that marks an interrogation or a search.""
81 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
See, e.g., People v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129, 1136 (Ill. App. Ct.), appeal
denied, 642 N.E.2d 1299 (Ill. 1994) (observing that physical intrusion of blood test to be
used for DNA profiling is 'relatively slight and poses no threat to the health or safety
of the individual tested").
83 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 772.
See id, at 771 n.13 (citing Breithaupt v. Abraham, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957)).
Id. at 771.
86 Id.
8470 U.S. 753 (1985).
as Id. at 762; see Juvenile Dep't of Multnomah County v. Orozco, 878 P.2d 432,
436 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); see also In re Appeal in Maricopa County Juvenile Action No.
JV 96-0020, 930 P.2d 496, 500-01 (Ariz. App. 1996).
89See Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048, 1050-51 (W.D. Wis. 1996)
(dicta suggesting that a cheek swab could be held to be more like fingerprints, and may
not even constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment).
90 Orozco, 878 P.2d at 435 (quoting Davis, 394 U.S. at 727); see also Rise v.
Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1562 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that the information derived is
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With new technology, the physical intrusions required
in collecting DNA may be de minimis.9' If the courts balance
this minimal physical intrusion against the governmental
interest, then even broader DNA testing for law enforcement
may be upheld. Yet, the intrusion of the search should be
viewed in more general terms. Thus, the courts have examined
the intrusion on the general privacy of the offender who is
required to comply with the statutorily mandated DNA test.
For example, the court in People v. Wealer92 found only minimal
intrusion on a convicted offender's privacy rights because the
DNA test is analogous to fingerprinting for identification
purposes, and an offender has only a minimal interest in his or
her identity after a criminal conviction. Even when convicted
persons are released on parole, they have a diminished
expectation of privacy in their identity as compared to free
persons.93 In relying on Schmerber and Winston, the courts
have ignored that, in both cases, the government had probable
cause to believe the arrestee committed a crime, that the
evidence sought was evidence of that crime, and that the Court
emphasized the affront to bodily integrity and dignity interests
in both cases.94
substantially the same as that derived from fingerprinting---"a unique identifying
marker"); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992).91 See, e.g., Roland A.H. von Oorschot & M.X. Jones, DNA Fingerprints from
Fingerprints, 387 NATURE 767 (1997) (describing techniques for obtaining DNA by
amplifying oil in skin deposited by making a fingerprint). In some instances, the DNA
analysis will not require any additional intrusion, such as when part of a specimen
collected for one purpose, for example, newborn screening, is simply used for a law
enforcement DNA data bank.
92 636 N.E.2d 1129, (Ill. Ct. App.), appeal denied, 642 N.E.2d 1299 (Ill. 1994).
93 See id. at 1137.
94 See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-771. In Schmerber, the Court found the blood
extraction reasonable because police had probable cause to believe the arrestee
committed a crime, and the blood was evidence of that crime. The Court noted that
'[the interests in human dignity and privacy which the Fourth Amendment protects
forbid any such intrusions on the mere chance that desired evidence might be
obtained." Id. at 760-70. In Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760-61 (1985), the Court
recognized that probable cause was required "where intrusions into the human body
are concerned," which implicate "deep-rooted expectations of privacy."
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(2) The Government Interest: The Data Bank Cases, City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, and Ferguson v. City of Charleston
The convicted offender data bank cases have uniformly
declared significant government interests in identifying and
prosecuting criminals and deterring recidivist acts,95 deterring
and prosecuting unsolved and future criminal acts,96 preserving
a permanent identification record for identifying felons who
may have otherwise altered their identify, and improving law
enforcement. Those courts attempting to characterize the
government interest as a "special need" beyond normal law
enforcement have had a particularly difficult time in
reconciling the concept of identification and prosecution of
criminals as something other than "law enforcement." For
example, in State v. Olivas," which upheld the Washington
DNA testing statute, the court stated that the purpose of the
DNA data bank was to deter and prosecute recidivist acts, and
that this purpose was a "special need" of government beyond
"normal" law enforcement. Even so, the Olivas court admitted
that the reasoning in Skinner and Von Raab, where drug tests
were used only for deterrence of employee drug use, and not for
prosecution, could not be applied squarely to a DNA testing
case.
99
Another court, noting that the purpose of the
Pennsylvania DNA testing statute was to be "a tool in criminal
investigations and for deterrence of recidivist crime,""'° held the
statute constitutional under the Fourth Amendment in light of
the government's "special need" to maintain an identification
system to facilitate the purpose of the statute.'1 One court
95 See, e.g., Rise, 59 F.3d at 1562 (describing the government interest as "the
public's incontestable interest in preventing recidivism and identiling and prosecuting
murderers and sexual offenders"); see also Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir.
1999); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1085 (Wash. 1993).96 See, e.g., Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (1Oth Cir. 1997).
97 Jones, 962 F.2d at 307.
93 856 P.2d 1076, 1085-86 (Wash. 1993). The Olivas court relied on the "special
needs" analysis in Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, although it noted that the Jones
court declined to resolve its case using this analysis, choosing instead to focus on the
diminished privacy rights of convicted offenders.
"Olivas, 856 P.2d at 1085.
'
0 Dial, 733 A.2d at 3.
,o0 See id. at 6-7. Although the court cites Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979),
(rather than the Turner test), it makes no attempt to justify the test based on any
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stated unequivocally that the state's DNA testing of prison
inmates was "ultimately for a law enforcement goal," yet the
court reasoned that the statute still fit within the "special
needs" analysis because it was "not undertaken for the
investigation of a specific crime.""2
The court in Roe v. Marcottel3 extended the "special
needs" doctrine a step further. First, the court recognized that
the "special needs" cases involving prisons were not precisely
on point because the purpose of the state DNA statute was not
related to protecting inmate health or safety, or concerns for
institutional order or discipline."4 Yet, the court reasoned, the
statute may still be constitutional if there is "some other
significant governmental interest in the form of 'special needs
beyond normal law enforcement,' even if those 'special needs'
are not directly tied to institutional concerns."1 5
(3) The Identification Exception
Courts reviewing the convicted offender DNA data bank
cases have consistently held that government-compelled DNA
extraction constitutes a search subject to Fourth Amendment
analysis.' 8 In light of rapid technological advancements,
however, DNA may soon be extracted with virtually no bodily
intrusion. If the government could take one's DNA without
intrusion upon one's personal security or privacy expectations,
then, arguably, no Fourth Amendment violation would exist.
Moreover, the government has a legitimate interest in
identifying the individuals it arrests or convicts. Identifying
information would be essential in the event of a prisoner
escape, or where the prisoner's.physical appearance is altered.
Taking fingerprints or photographs upon arrest has not
been held to violate the Fourth Amendment. 7 Under the same
penological objective.
102 Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048, 1050 (W.D. Wis. 1996)
(construing Wisconsin's DNA testing statute) (emphasis added).
10 193 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 1999).
104 See id. at 78.
105 See id. at 79.
06 See supra, Part I.B.1.a.
107 See Smith v. United States, 324 F.2d 879, 882 (D.C. Cir. 1963) ("it is
elementary that a person in lawful custody may be required to submit to . . .
fingerprinting... as part of the routine identification process."); see also Napolitano v.
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reasoning, one could argue that taking DNA in a non-intrusive
manner solely for identification purposes most likely would not
violate the Fourth Amendment. Several courts bolster this
point by focusing on the reduced expectation of privacy an
offender has in his or her identity. In the earliest case to
address the constitutionality of a state DNA testing statute,
the Fourth Circuit, in Jones v. Murray,' based its decision
upholding the Virginia statute on the diminished privacy
rights of convicted prisoners. The court reasoned that when a
person is arrested, the arrestee's identity becomes a matter of
government interest, and the arrestee must submit to
fingerprinting whether or not the crime involved fingerprint
evidence."0 9 The court held that when an offender is lawfully in
state custody, "[als with fingerprinting, . . . the Fourth
Amendment does not require an additional finding of
individualized suspicion before blood can be taken from
incarcerated felons for the purpose of identifying them."1
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit, in Rise v. Oregon,"'
analogized taking DNA from a convicted offender to taking
fingerprints, noting that, although taking fingerprints from a
"free person" implicated privacy rights and required probable
cause, this was not the case when fingerprints were routinely
taken from arrestees for identification purposes during the
booking process." Once convicted, the court reasoned, one's
identity is a matter of state interest, and the offender "has lost
any legitimate expectation of privacy in the identifying
information derived from blood sampling.""' Moreover, in
Landry v. Attorney General,"4 the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court held that taking a DNA sample is only
minimally more intrusive than taking and storing fingerprints
or photographs, and this minimal intrusion is only for the
United States, 340 F.2d 313, 314 (1st Cir. 1965) ("Taking fingerprints [prior to bail] is
universally standard procedure, and no violation of constitutional rights").
108 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 977 (1992).
'
9 See id. at 306.
.. Id. at 306-07.
1 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1160 (1996) (noting that
once arrested, individuals have a lesser expectation of privacy in their identity, and
thus in their fingerprints as a record of their identity, whether or not the criminal
investigation involves fingerprint evidence).
112 Id. at 1560.
113 Id.
114 709 N.E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1073 (2000).
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purpose of adding to a record of identity and is not a search for
evidence. The Landry court reasoned that the convicted
offender's low expectation of privacy in his identity was
outweighed by the state's interest in preserving a permanent
identification record of convicted offenders to resolve past and
future crimes.115 Where the state has traditionally used
fingerprints for this purpose, the court announced, it would
now use DNA identification.'16
2. Other Legal Challenges
a. Equal Protection
The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
provides that no state shall "deny any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.""' Some inmates
have argued that state laws requiring DNA samples only from
certain classes of offenders treat them differently from others
offenders not required to provide DNA samples."8 Because the
classification of "sex offender" or "murderer" is based on the
nature of the inmate's offense and not on a suspect class (such
as race), these challenges to the DNA statutes receive "rational
basis" review."9 Under this test, the statute is presumed valid
if the offender classification is rationally related to a legitimate
state interest. 21 Courts reviewing inmates' equal protection
claims consistently find a rational relationship between the
government's classification of certain offenders and the
"' See id. at 1092.
11 See id.; see also Boling, 101 F.3d at 1340 (holding that information
derived from DNA blood sample is substantially the same as the identifying
information derived from fingerprinting); Johnson v. Virginia, 529 S.E.2d 769, 779 (Va.
2000) (following Jones v. Murray, holding in the case of minimal privacy afforded
convicted felons, minimal intrusion of DNA blood test outweighed by Virginia's interest
in improved law enforcement); Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp. 1048 (W.D. Wis.
1996) (using a cheek swab to obtain DNA could be viewed as part of identification
process rather than as search).
117 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
"8 See, e.g., Marcotte, 193 F.3d at 82; Boling, 101 F.3d at 1341.
119 See Marcotte, 193 F.3d at 72 (citing Artway v. Attorney General, 81 F.3d
1235, 1267 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that sex offenders are not a suspect class for
purposes of equal protection analysis)).
120 See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 81 (1988).
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government's objective to investigate and prosecute similar
classes of unsolved and future crimes. 2 '
b. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment prohibits government
imposition of cruel and unusual punishment.122 A prison inmate
has an Eighth Amendment claim when actions of prison
officials amount to the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain," " or when officials act with "deliberate indifference" to
serious medical needs" or act "maliciously and sadistically to
cause harm."" The alleged deprivation must be sufficiently
serious to deny "the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities."126 Inmate challenges to DNA data bank statutes
have alleged, among other things, that prison officials used
excessive force to obtain DNA samples, that an inmate's rights
were violated when he was placed indefinitely in
administrative segregation until he consented to provide a
DNA sample,'27 and that the actual blood test itself constituted
cruel and unusual punishment.'28 Courts have rejected these
arguments and viewed an inmate's refusal to provide a DNA
sample as a refusal to comply with a direct administrative
121 See Boling, 101 F.3d at 1341; see also Rise, 59 F.3d at 1561 (holding
statute's requirement to obtain DNA samples from inmates convicted of murder of sex
offenses bore rational relationship to the public interest in identifying and prosecuting
murders and sex offenders).
122 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
'2 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319 (1986).
12' Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
125 Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,7 (1992).
126 Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
1 See Cooper v. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699, 707 (Mo. App. 1997).
128 Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583, 588 (D. Minn. 1995), affd on other
grounds, 77 F.3d 1071 (8' Cir. 1996) (finding unconsented drawing of prisoner's blood
by trained technician in accordance with medically acceptable procedures did not
amount to the wanton infliction of pain under the Eighth Amendment); Ryncarz v.
Eikenberry, 824 F. Supp. 1493, 1501 (E.D. Wash. 1993) (concluding that inmate's
claims that he was placed in full physical restraints prior to blood draw, officials used
unsanitized needle, and that his blood vessels ruptured, resulting in internal scars,
hemorrhaging, and impaired movement of his left arm, were not sufficiently harmful to
amount to deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Eighth
Amendment).
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order, and state statutes typically permit the use of force by
prison officials to ensure compliance with lawful orders.'29
c. Ex Post Facto
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States
Constitution.. prohibits the states from "retroactively
alter[ing] the definition of crimes or increas[ing] the
punishment for criminal acts."13' Even though state DNA
statutes typically apply to persons convicted prior to the
statute's enactment, courts have not found violation of the Ex
Post Facto Clause as long as the statute does not amend the
state's substantive criminal laws and the statute's "overall
design and effect" indicates a "non-punitive intent." 132 Statutes
requiring certain offenders to provide a DNA sample for the
data bank are considered administrative, rather than penal."3
Thus, when a prisoner loses "good-time credit" for refusing to
submit to DNA sampling, the Ex Post Facto Clause is not
violated.14 Just as an inmate is awarded good-time credit for
compliance with administrative regulations, one court
reasoned, he can lose credit for non-compliance." 5 However, in
Jones v. Murray,"' the court held the Ex Post Facto Clause was
violated where an inmate's statutorily mandated release date
was delayed when he refused to provide a DNA sample. At the
time the inmate was sentenced, a statute mandated parole six
129 See Sanders v. Coman, 864 F. Supp. 496, 500 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (holding that
DNA procedure is a lawful administrative order, and may be enforced the same way as
other lawful orders of prison officials, according to state statute that expressly permits
the use of force to ensure compliance); see also Ewell v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482 (4th Cir.
1993).
1"0 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10., cl. 1 ("No state shall.., pass any... ex post facto
Law").
,.. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990).
132 See, e.g., Rise, 59 F.3d at 1562 (declaring Ex Post Facto Clause not
violated where purpose of data bank statute was to assist in identification, arrest, and
prosecution of criminals, rather than to punish offenders) (quoting United States v.
Huss, 7 F.3d 1444, 1447 (9th Cir. 1993)).
13 See Ewell v. Murray, 11 F.3d 482, 487 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding prison
regulation allowing loss of good-time credit and possible placement in isolation for up
to fifteen days for refusal to provide DNA sample was a reasonable prison regulation
and did not violate ex post facto clause).
134 See id.
135 Id.
13G 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
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months prior to the inmate's release date. A subsequent
statute was passed requiring the inmate to provide a blood
sample as a condition of his release from custody. The court
held that the statute was ex post facto because it denied the
inmate a sentence benefit that he had at the time the offense
was committed. 37
d. Self-Incrimination
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination protects an accused's right to remain silent
unless he or she chooses to speak.'38 The government may not
compel an accused to testify against himself or herself, or to
provide the state with testimonial evidence or evidence of a
communicative nature,'39 such as incriminating private books
and records.4 ' The privilege does not, however, protect an
accused against compulsion to produce a voice exemplar,'
submit to fingerprinting, photography, measurements, to
appear in court, to stand, to walk, or to make a particular
gesture." Neither does the Fifth Amendment protect the
accused from the compelled production of blood"'or
urine.'"Courts examining the constitutionality of the state
data bank statutes have consistently held that the DNA
contained in one's blood or saliva is non-testimonial, and no
Fifth Amendment privilege is violated. 5
... Id. at 310.
138 U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself .... See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-61
(1966).
139 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761.
... See Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 11 (citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634-
35 (1886)) (stating that government could not compel accused to produce incriminating
invoices).
14 Id. at 15.
1 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223 (1967) (recognizing that federal
and state courts have held the Fifth Amendment "offers no protection against
compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photography, or measurements... to appear in
court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture").
' See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 761.
144 See Lucero v. Gunter, 17 F.3d 1347, 1350 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding urine is
non-testimonial in nature; thus prisoner's compelled urine for drug test raised no Fifth
Amendment challenge).
1 See Shaffer v. Saffle, 148 F.3d 1180 (10th Cir. 1998); Boling v. Romer, 101
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e. Procedural and Substantive Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state
shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . .,146 Offenders' procedural due process
claims focus on their denial of notice or a hearing before they
are compelled to provide a DNA sample. The argument that
one state's DNA statute violated an inmate's due process rights
because it did not require that notice be given to individuals
whose DNA is seized was rejected because the statute itself
provided notice that all convicted felons would be required to
give a blood sample for DNA analysis.147 Similarly, an inmate's
complaint that the Due Process Clause required prison officials
to provide him with a hearing before forcing him to provide a
blood sample was rejected because the state's DNA statute
required only a conviction for a predicate offense before a DNA
sample was required; thus, there was nothing to be contested
at a hearing.4 ' For the same reason, another court rejected an
inmate's claim that prison officials deprived him of a property
interest in his blood without due process or just
compensation.'49
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of "due process of law" as including a
substantive component. 5 ' Substantive due process rights are
violated by government actions that "offend those canons of
decency and fairness which express the notions of justice,"5'
and refer to those constitutional guarantees that are "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty." 2 In Rochin v. California,"'
the Court held that the Due Process Clause was violated when
police handcuffed a suspect, took him to a hospital, and had his
stomach forcibly pumped to reveal two morphine capsules.'
F.3d 1336 (10th Cir. 1996); Cooper v. Gannon, 943 S.W.2d 699 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997);
Johnson v. Virginia, 529 S.E.2d 769 (Va. 2000).4 G U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
147 See Johnson, 529 S.E.2d at 780.
1
4 8 See Rise, 59 F.3d at 1562-63.
149 See Boling, 101 F.3d at 1340-41.
ISO See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986).
,51 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945)).
152 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
'G 342 U.S. at 165.
' Id. at 166.
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The Court stated that such behavior "shocks the conscience"155
and "offends a sense of justice"'56 and amounted to a confession
wrested from defendant's body by physical abuse.5 7 In contrast,
courts have rejected inmate claims under due process analysis,
finding that no due process violation occurs when blood is
drawn for DNA analysis according to medically acceptable
protocols.'
f. Separation of Powers
Under the doctrine of separation of powers, also called
the "inviolability of final judgment" rule, a court's final
judgment, which includes the defendant's sentence, may not be
altered by subsequent legislative changes.'59 In a Pennsylvania
case, an inmate challenged a state statute providing that a
prisoner who refuses to submit to DNA testing must remain
confined until serving the maximum sentence.6 ' The court held
that the statute did not violate the separation of powers
doctrine because it did not alter the inmate's parole eligibility
date nor his maximum sentence. 6' The power to parole,
reasoned the court, is an administrative function that depends
on compliance with many different prison rules and
administrative requirements, and the state statute presented
an administrative requirement that must be satisfied prior to
release. 6 '
However, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a state
statute requiring the court to use its contempt power to enforce
administrative orders to collect blood samples from convicted
offenders was unconstitutional under the Illinois constitution's
separation of powers provision. 6' That court noted, however,
that the blood collection program could still be executed
independently of the unconstitutional contempt provision.'64
'" Id. at 172.
156 Id. at 173 (quoting Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285-86 (1936)).
117 Id. at 167.
"" See, e.g., Kruger, 875 F. Supp. at 587.
'59 See Dial v. Vaughn, 733 A.2d 1 (Pa. 1999).
160 See id. at 4.
161 Id.
162 Id.
'6 Murnmeigh v. Gainer, 685 N.E.2d 1357, 1364-67 (IM. 1997).
164 Id.
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3. The Constitutionality of Expanded DNA Law
Enforcement Data Banks
Equal protection, cruel and unusual punishment, ex
post facto, self-incrimination, due process, and separation of
powers claims have made virtually no headway in the lower
courts, and the Supreme Court has given no indication that
constitutional challenges to state DNA data bank laws on these
grounds would be successful. Should the Court grant review on
the issue of the constitutionality of expanded DNA law
enforcement data banks, it is most likely to do so to consider
Fourth Amendment issues. Two recent decisions of the Court
raise serious questions about the "government interest" aspect
of the balancing test applied by the lower courts in the Fourth
Amendment data bank cases.
In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,1"5 motorists brought
a class action against the city, alleging that its drug
interdiction checkpoint violated their rights under the Fourth
Amendment.166 The city conceded that the goal of the
checkpoint program was to catch drug offenders.167 The Court
began its analysis with an overview of the "limited
circumstances" in which a suspicionless search is reasonable,
citing the employee drug testing cases of Von Raab and
Skinner, as well as the Court's early roadblock and checkpoint
cases."' The Court stated that in none of these cases had it
ever indicated approval of a checkpoint program "whose
primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing.' '169 The Court said that in the checkpoint cases the
government interest was specific and the program was related
to that interest, for example, policing the Nation's borders
where stemming illegal immigration could not be accomplished
any other way; reducing the immediate hazard posed by drunk
drivers on the highways where there was an obvious
connection between highway safety and the checkpoint
165 532 U.S. 32 (2000). Although Edmond is a narcotics checkpoint case,
the majority of databank cases cite to the early checkpoint cases as the authority for
the balancing test that is applied to suspicionless searches.
166 Id. at 36.
IG7 Id. at 40.
168 Id. at 37.
1"9 Id. at 38.
[Vol. 67: 1
LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES
program; and allowing vehicle inspections because proper
licensing and registration is related to highway safety.70 These
interests, according to the Court, were distinct from the
general purpose of investigating crime. The city's narcotics
checkpoint program differed from the previous cases because
its primary purpose was "to advance the general interest in
crime control." 7'
The city argued that its checkpoint program was
justified by a lawful secondary purpose of checking vehicles
and keeping impaired drivers off the road, but the Court
dismissed this point, stating that "[ilf this were the case ...
law enforcement authorities would be able to establish
checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as they also
included a license or sobriety check."'72 The Court held that the
city's program was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment because its primary purpose was "ultimately
indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control
. . . ." Absent some indicia of individualized suspicion, the
search was illegal. The Edmond case, therefore, calls into
question the reasoning of the courts in essentially all of the
DNA data bank cases with respect to their characterization of
the "government interest" side of the balancing test, which is
"virtually indistinguishable from the general interest in crime
control."
More recently, in Ferguson v. City of Charleston,'74 the
Supreme Court applied the Edmond "primary purpose test" to
a case described by the lower court as a "special needs" case. In
Ferguson, a state university hospital tested the urine of certain
of its obstetrical patients suspected of drug use and notified
police of positive drug screens. The hospital conducted the drug
tests in accordance with a hospital policy developed in
conjunction with law enforcement officials. Maternity patients
arrested after testing positive for cocaine challenged the
hospital's policy, claiming the drug tests were an
unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment.7 ' The
170 Edmond, 532 U.S. at 38-39.
7 Id. at 44 (quoting Prouse, 440 U.S. at 649 n.18).
17 Id. at 46.
17 Id. at 48.
174 121 S. Ct. 1281 (2001).
'
7 See id. at 1284. For purposes of its Fourth Amendment analysis, the Court
assumed the patients had not consented to the drug testing.
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hospital policy provided for, among other things, a chain of
custody for the urine sample so it could be used in later
prosecutions, a range of possible criminal charges, and police
notification and patient arrest after a positive test.76 The city
argued that the hospital policy met the special needs exception
to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement because the
hospital had a need to facilitate the mother's drug treatment,
and to protect the mother and unborn child-a need the
hospital claimed was distinct from the normal needs of law
enforcement.
177
The Supreme Court held that the hospital policy
violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court noted the
extensive involvement of police and prosecutors throughout the
development of the policy and it held that although the
ultimate goal of the hospital policy may have been to get the
women off drugs and into a substance abuse program for the
benefit of both mother and baby, the policy was
unconstitutional because "the immediate objective of the
searches was to generate evidence for law enforcement
purposes .8.."' The Court said that "virtually any
nonconsensual suspicionless search could be immunized under
the special needs doctrine by defining the search solely in
terms of its ultimate, rather than immediate, purpose."79 The
Court distinguished its other special needs cases, which had
legitimate civil objectives, and did not involve the extensive
entanglement of law enforcement as did this case. 8 '
Edmond and Ferguson raise serious Fourth Amendment
concerns with respect to the constitutionality of the data bank
laws, and even greater concerns as to the constitutionality of
state statutes that require DNA from certain classes of
offenders upon arrest.' Virtually all of the lower courts
considering the question agree that the bodily intrusion
involved in extracting DNA constitutes a search, and that the
17G See id. at 1285.
'77 See id. at 1286.
'
78 Id. at 1291 (emphasis in original).
179 Ferguson, 121 S. Ct. at 1292.
ISO See id.
'81 The Louisiana statute provides: "A person who is arrested for a felony sex
offense . . . shall have a DNA sample drawn or taken at the same time he is
fingerprinted pursuant to the booking procedure." LA. REV. ANN. STAT. § 15:609(A)
(West 2000).
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primary government purpose is general crime control and
investigation-now an unconstitutional "primary purpose"
under Edmond and Ferguson. Thus, courts seem to be faced
with two choices: either distinguish these Supreme Court cases
characterizing the primary purpose of the DNA data bank to be
something other than general crime control, or view DNA
sampling under the identification exception.
It is uncertain how the courts would reconcile Edmond
and Ferguson with the existence of the DNA data bank.
Perhaps courts could more easily hold the data bank
constitutional if it were limited to profiles of sex offenders and
violent felons, as opposed to the "all felonies" allowed by seven
states.182 If statistics supported the likelihood of recidivism and
that these particular criminals were more likely to leave DNA
at the crime scene, then perhaps the "primary purpose" of the
data bank program could be characterized as controlling
recidivism of these specific classes of offenders, rather than the
unconstitutional purpose of general crime control. Even so, this
analysis is tenuous in light of the recent Supreme Court cases.
A second possibility would be for the courts simply to
view DNA sampling as a relatively non-invasive administrative
means of identification which, like fingerprints or photographs,
does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Courts have not
viewed piercing the skin to draw blood as particularly intrusive
as long as medically accepted practices are employed, and
using a buccal swab to obtain a DNA sample from saliva is
even less intrusive. Under the identification exception, then,
the government could compel a DNA sample from all persons
whom it has a legitimate need to identify. Arguably, DNA
could be taken subsequent to an arrest based upon probable
cause, digitalized, stored, and accessed to solve past and future
crimes, all without running afoul of the Fourth Amendment, so
long as the primary purpose of the initial testing was
identification.183
See infra, Appendix, Tbl. 1.
'8 The Supreme Court's most recent decision on the expectation of privacy for
Fourth Amendment purposes is United States v. Kyllo, 121 S. Ct. 2038 (2001). The
Court held, five-to-four, that police officers violated the Fourth Amendment when they
used a thermal imaging scanner outside of a home in an effort to detect the presence of
high intensity lights used to grow marijuana indoors.
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A broad, fingerprint-like identification exception would
ignore the fundamental differences between DNA and
fingerprints. A fingerprint reveals only unique patterns of
loops and whorls. In contrast, a DNA sample is the
information-containing blueprint of human life, revealing one's
genetic predisposition to disease, physical and mental
characteristics, and a host of other private facts not evident to
the public. Unlike fingerprint analysis, DNA analysis does not
necessarily end with a DNA identification profile. Typical law
enforcement practice today is to retain the subject's DNA
sample indefinitely because of the possibility that technological
advancements might require re-testing of the samples."M
Indefinite sample retention increases the opportunity for
misuse or abuse of the samples and intrusion on the privacy of
individuals providing the identifiable samples. Moreover, many
state statutes allow access to the samples for undefined law
enforcement purposes.8 5  and humanitarian identification
purposes,'86 or authorize the use of samples for assisting
medical research 87or to support identification research and
protocol development. 8 8 No statutes provide for the informed
consent of the DNA donors prior to conducting such research."9
Unlike the laboratory analysis of fingerprints, the Supreme
Court has recognized that a laboratory analysis of blood and
other bodily fluids constitutes a "second search" subject to the
'" The F.B.I. is opposed to the destruction of stored DNA samples. Reasons for
opposition include: (1) to maintain uniformity among the states because virtually all
states require sample retention; (2) to avoid the prohibitive cost of re-typing convicted
offenders once they have been released from prison, should it be necessary;, (3) to
assure data base consistency among the states in light of technological advances; (4) to
allow re-checking a hit against the sample to assure a sample has not been mistyped,
thus avoiding the release of a person's name to law enforcement personnel by mistake;
and (5) that it is safe to retain samples because no abuse of stored samples has been
reported in over ten years of databasing. Dr. Tom Callaghan, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Program Manager, Federal Convicted Offender Database, Statement
before the National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence (Sep. 26, 1999),
available at http'J/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/dna (last visited April 8, 2001).
:8S See, e.g., TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 411.147(e) (Vernon 2000).
18G See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:611 (West 2000).
187 See ALA. CODE § 36-18-20 (b) (2000); ALA. CODE §§ 36-38-24 (a) and
(c)(2000).188 See IND. CODE. § 10-1-9-13 (a)(3)(B) (2000).
189 Federal law requires the informed consent of persons prior to their
participation in medical research. Serious issues pertaining to informed consent are
raised by some state DNA data bank statutes, but that discussion is beyond the scope
of this article.
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Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement.9 ' Thus, any
reasonableness determination ought to include an analysis of
the use that law enforcement authorities intend to make of the
DNA sample. 9'
II. POLICY ISSUES
A. The Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data Banks
The constitutionality of expanding the scope of law
enforcement data banks will remain unresolved in the absence
of a definitive ruling by the Supreme Court. Despite
constitutional issues of some gravity, it is quite possible that
expanded data banking would be upheld by the Supreme
Court. Just because a law is constitutional, however, does not
necessarily mean that it reflects sound public policy. Thus,
legislators, law enforcement officials, and all citizens interested
in DNA forensics need to consider a range of issues in addition
to predictions about whether a proposed law is constitutional.
In little more than a decade, DNA has proven to be the
most powerful forensic tool ever developed. It is this power to
convict the guilty and exonerate the innocent that hds provided
the impetus to expand the scope of data banks beyond sex
offenders. 9' In 2000, in response to a request from then-
Attorney General Janet Reno, the U.S. National Commission
on the Future of DNA Evidence considered whether data banks
should be expanded to include samples from arrestees. The
Commission recommended against including arrestees on the
ground that there were already hundreds of thousands of
190 See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17 ("The ensuing chemical analysis of
the sample to obtain physiological data is a further invasion of the tested employee's
privacy interests .... It is not disputed ... that chemical analysis of urine, like that of
blood, can reveal a host of private medical facts about an employee, including whether
he or she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic.").
... See generally Harold J. Kent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions
Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REV. 49 (1995).
192 The power of DNA technology to exonerate previously convicted individuals
has led to legislation authorizing the DNA testing of evidence from prior crimes to
determine whether any convictions were in error. See, e.g., 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. §
5/116-3 (2000); MINN. STAT. § 590.01 (2000); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30 (2001).
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samples waiting to be analyzed and there was no practical way
that the state crime laboratories could process more samples.193
Such a concern is likely to be transitory or amenable to
resolution through increased funding. Therefore, the issues
still need to be addressed directly from a policy rather than a
practical standpoint.
The argument in favor of expanding the scope of the
data banks is easy to characterize. The more samples in the
data bank, the greater the likelihood of a match or "cold hit."'94
This is a reasonable inference, but there is little empirical
evidence.'95  If public policy must balance a range of
increasingly intrusive options to individual rights against the
asserted benefits to law enforcement, it is incumbent upon
those advocating an expansion of police powers to demonstrate
how substantial public interests in deterrence and justice are
fostered by expanded DNA data banks.
A variety of arguments have been raised in opposition to
expanding the scope of the DNA data banks. Some commonly
raised objections are that samples could be analyzed to reveal
future health risks9 and that this information might be
disclosed to third parties such as insurers and employers, 97
that the information could be used for research into purported
genetic links to criminality,'98 and that the information could be
' Recommendation of the National Commission on the Future of DNA
Evidence to the Attorney General Regarding Arrestee DNA Sample Collection (2000),
available at http/www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/dna/arrestrc.html (last visited April 8, 2001).
14As of October 13, 1998, CODIS had generated more than 400 "cold hits."
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, FBI, Oct. 13, 1998.
"S According to Paul Ferrera, Director of the Virginia Division of Forensic
Science, 85% of hits would have been missed if the data bank were limited only to
violent offenders. A Florida study reportedly showed that 52% of Florida offenders
linked to sexual assaults and homicides by DNA data base matches had prior burglary
convictions, a non-violent offense. Schellberg, supra note 26, at 23.
19. Paul Giannelli et al., Genetic Information, Law, Legal Issues in Law
Enforcement DNA Databases, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLICY
ISsUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY 413 (Thomas H. Murray & Maxwell J. Mehlman eds. 2000);
Eric T. Juengst, I-DNA-Fication, Personal Privacy, and Social Justice, 75 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 61 (1999); Testimony of Barry Steinhardt, Assoc. Dir., American Civil Liberties
Union, before House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crime, Mar. 23, 2000
[hereinafter Steinhardt Testimony].
97 Giannelli et al., supra note 196; Paul A. Lombardo, Genetic Confidentiality:
What's the Big Secret?, 3 U. CHI. LAW SCH. ROUNDTABLE 589 (1996); Steinhardt
Testimony, supra note 196.
'98 See Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement's Greatest
Surveillance Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 817-21 (1999); Juengst, supra note
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used for child support or immigration purposes. These and
related concerns about improper uses of DNA samples would
be eliminated if only noncoding regions of DNA were analyzed
and the samples were destroyed after analysis.'99 What would
remain would be a computerized code of numbers with no value
whatsoever beyond identification."°
Even the above safeguards are unlikely to convince
individuals who believe that the balance between law
enforcement and civil liberties would be tilted too far in the
196; Steinhardt Testimony, supra note 196.
'" In the last few years, both the forensic testing community in the United
States and commercial vendors have agreed on the use of a standardized set of thirteen
core short tandem repeat ("STR") loci for forensic cases. STR markers are tandemly
repeated sequences of two to six base pair units, and alleles are typically 100-400 base
pairs in size. These STR loci typically contain between seven and fifteen alleles. Of the
thirteen core STRs in use, twelve are located in non-coding regions. JOHN M. BUTLER,
FORENSIC TYPING BIOLOGY AND TECHNOLOGY BEHIND STR MARKERs 322 (2001). Thus,
the issue of non-coding regions is largely addressed by current technology, but the laws
do not require the use of non-coding regions and new technology could use coding
regions.
20 In his commentary on our article, David H. Kaye, Two Fallacies About DNA
Data Banks for Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 179 (2001), Professor Kaye
criticizes our proposal to use only non-coding regions of the genome for analysis. He
agrees with our general concern that only those portions of the genome that indicate
future health or other features of social concern should be analyzed. Yet, he cannot
resist quibbling with our definition of non-coding regions and with our underlying
rationale. He offers no evidence of the need to use coding regions and fails to give any
weight to public concerns about possible uses of the test results beyond law
enforcement.
Our proposal to use only non-coding regions of the genome for analysis takes
into account the public's concerns about possible discriminatory use of genetic
information or improper behavioral genetic research. Professor Kaye would require us
to cite examples of genetic discrimination or behavioral genetic research run amok. But
he misses the point. In determining social policy, it is important that the public accept
the government action. The public is extremely concerned about possible misuse of
genetic information. That is why many at-risk individuals decline genetic testing and
why, despite a paucity of incidents of discrimination, most states have enacted laws
prohibiting genetic discrimination in employment and health insurance. The current
STR loci do not use coding regions (with only one exception, the CSFIPO marker).
BUTLER, supra note 199. It is unnecessary to use non-coding regions now (no matter
how defined), and it is unlikely that it will be necessary to use non-coding regions in
the future. We believe that the principle of using the least intrusive method of analysis
consistent with the needs of law enforcement is widely supported by the law
enforcement community, see infra, note 209 and accompanying text, as well as the
public. Our proposal seeks to prevent the future use of coding regions. We believe that
using non-coding regions increases the social acceptability of a DNA data bank of any
scope. Professor Kaye actually weakens his case for broader data banks by choosing to
contest this issue. Cf Amar, supra note 13, at 69 (arguing for national data bank and
using only "junk DNA' for analysis).
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direction of law enforcement if broader DNA data banks were
established. The opportunity to solve more crimes would not
justify having every citizen's DNA analyzed for law
enforcement purposes.
In deciding challenges to existing data bank laws,
several judges have expressed concerns about possible
expansions of the data banks. For example, in Jones v.
Murray,"1 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit upheld the constitutionality of the Virginia data bank
law, which requires samples from all felons, even those who
have been convicted of nonviolent crimes. The decision to
include all felons in the data bank was made for administrative
convenience, rather than to improve law enforcement. The
dissenting judge wrote that the case
leads me to a deep, disturbing, and overriding concern that, without
a proper and compelling justification, the Commonwealth may be
successful in taking significant strides toward establishment of a
future police state, in which broad and vague concerns for
administrative efficiency will serve to support substantial intrusions
into the privacy of citizens.
202
In State v. Olivas, 3 in upholding the Washington statute, the
concurring opinion stated: "We would be appalled, I hope, if the
State mandated non-consensual blood tests of the public at
large for purposes of developing a comprehensive Washington
DNA databank."20
4
We are willing to concede that a nationwide data bank
is likely to be valuable to law enforcement personnel. Having
such value is an important but not necessarily determinative
factor in deciding the appropriate scope of the data bank. A
201 962 F.2d 302 (4th Cir. 1992).
202 Id. at 315 (Murnaghan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
2'3 856 P.2d 1076 (Wash. 1993).
204 Id. at 1094 (Utter, J., concurring). The proposal for a nationwide
identification data bank would not be without precedent. For example, in 1943,
Senator William Langer of North Dakota introduced legislation to mandate a
nationwide fingerprinting system. S. 1191, 78' Cong., (1943) (proposing a bill to
require certain persons within the United States to carry identification cards and be
fingerprinted for other purposes). As with other similar bills, this legislation was not
acted on. It is not clear whether there would be any political support today for a
mandatory, nationwide DNA law enforcement data bank. It is possible that the public
would support any law expanding the testing of offenders or even arrestees, but resist
including all of the population.
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variety of law enforcement methods we deem socially
unacceptable (if not unconstitutional), if used, would likely lead
to more convictions and perhaps even a reduction in crime.
Some law enforcement measures used in other parts of the
world would not be countenanced here. Although a coerced
confession, for example, is quite different from compiling a
large-scale DNA data bank, the broad issue of societal values
pertains to both. As one commentator argued, "Ultimately,
determining who should be in a forensic DNA data bank will
require balancing the quantifiable law enforcement benefits
that large data banks can confer against the less quantifiable,
but nonetheless real, risks to civil liberties that they may
implicate.""5
B. Other Issues
Regardless of the scope of law enforcement DNA data
banks, other issues need to be addressed in balancing the
interests of law enforcement against individual interests in
privacy. The following measures should be implemented.
1. Sample collection - Current collection methods use both
blood samples and buccal swabs. Using buccal swabs is
less invasive, which minimizes sample source objections
and legal challenges.
2. Analytical methods - Current analytical methods .use
polymerase chain reaction ("PCR), restriction fragment
length polymorphism ("RFLP"), and short tandem
repeat ("STh") technologies.2 ' Analytical methods
should be standardized, and STR represents the best
current technology.
27
05 Jean E. McEwen, DNA Data Banks, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING
PRIVACYAND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 236 (Mark A. Rothstein ed. 1997).
See National Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence, The Future of
Forensic DNA Testing: Predictions of the Research and Development Working Group
1-3 (2000) [hereinafter The Future ofForensice DNA Testing].2 7 See id. See also supra note 199.
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3. DNA to be analyzed - Only non-coding regions of DNA"
should be used for analysis, thereby ensuring that the
only possible use of the DNA analysis is identification.2"9
The use of noncoding regions is endorsed by experts at
the FBI. According to two leading DNA forensic experts for the
FBI:
Unlike medically oriented DNA analyses, forensic DNA typing
does not derive the donor's predisposition to genetic diseases or
the expression of genetic disease conditions. The genetic loci
used in forensic DNA typing are selected for certain attributes,
which include genetic variability among individuals, stability,
and ease of assay. The majority of genetic markers used in DNA
typing are noncoding segments in the human genome. No
known function encoded in these repetitive DNA sequences
might predispose an individual to a particular disease or
attribute.
2 1 0
208 The human genome is comprised of exons (1.1%), introns (24%), and
intergenic DNA (75%). J. Craig Venter et al., The Sequence of the Human Genome, 291
Sci. 1304, 1305 (2001). Exons are the regions of genes that code for the production of
proteins. Therefore, the exons are the "coding" regions that contain information about
current or future gene products that may be expressed phenotypically. Introns are the
non-coding regions that separate one exon of the gene from another. Intergenic DNA is
noncoding and comprises a majority of the genome; although sometimes referred to as
"junk DNA," additional research is likely to reveal both the functional and evolutionary
significance of these regions.
209 See supra note 200.
210 Randall S. Murch & Bruce Bodowle, Are Developments in Forensic
Applications of DNA Technology Consistent with Privacy Protections?, in GENETIC
SECRETS, supra note 205, at 224 (Randall S. Murch, Ph.D., is Chief, Scientific Analysis
Section, FBI; Bruce Budowle, Ph.D., is Chief, Forensic Science Research Unit, FBI).
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4. Laboratory certification - All laboratories maintaining
forensic DNA data bases should be certified and adhere
to the highest standards of technical proficiency,
including quality assurance and quality control
protocols.21' The American Society of Crime Laboratory
Directors-Laboratory Accreditation Board accredits
forensic laboratories.
5. Statistical and Reporting Issues - All statistical
methodologies used for determining a match between a
crime scene or other sample and a DNA profile in the
data bank should adhere to the latest scientific
principles.
2 12
6. Destruction of samples - Law enforcement officials,
including the FBI, favor retaining samples indefinitely
for quality assurance and re-typing the samples in the
event of changing technology.213 Twenty-nine state laws
either authorize or require that agencies retain samples
after analysis; only one state (Wisconsin) requires the
destruction of samples, and no samples have actually
been destroyed.214 The retention of samples, however,
even under conditions of stringent security, raises
concerns among the public that the samples could be re-
analyzed for purposes other than identification.
Therefore, samples should be destroyed immediately
after analysis.
211 See generally Ad Hoe Committee on Individual Identification by DNA
Analysis, Individual Identification by DNA Analysis: Points to Consider, 46 AM. J.
HuMAN GENETICS 631 (1991) (encouraging laboratory quality). Two FBI-appointed
groups, the Technical Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods ("TWGDAM') and the
DNA Advisory Board ("DAB") also encourage laboratories to seek accreditation.
212 See The Future of Forensic DNA Testing, supra note 206, at 56-68; David H.
Kaye & George F. Sensabaugh, Jr., Reference Guide on DNA Evidence, in FEDERAL
JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON ScIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 516-48 (2d ed. 2000).
213 See The Future of Forensic DNA Testing, supra note 206, at 36.
214 Kimnelman, supra note 14, at 211.
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It is important to keep in mind that retaining the
original sample in a forensic DNA repository for possible
reanalysis is not necessary to prevent erroneous matches. If a
suspect whose DNA is matched to crime scene evidence
believes that the match is erroneous, the suspect can merely
provide a new sample for comparison. Only the crime scene
evidence needs to be retained. Consequently, destruction of the
sample after analysis provides further assurance that the
sample will not be reanalyzed for an improper purpose without
interfering with the lawful use of the sample by law
enforcement. "The National Academy of Sciences, recognizing
the risks to privacy and individual autonomy that stored DNA
samples can present, has recommended that samples taken
from convicted offenders for data banks be destroyed 'promptly'
after being analyzed."215
7. Access to data bank - Access to the data banks should be
limited to law enforcement personnel, and data banks
should not be used for any purpose other than
identification, including research.216 It is well settled
that government funded or sponsored research
involving human subjects requires voluntary, informed
consent.217 Legally-mandated consent or coerced consent
from offenders as a condition of their release would not
satisfy this standard. More fundamentally, as a matter
of policy if not law, to justify a governmental intrusion
there should be a compelling government interest. With
certain limitations, law enforcement would be such an
215 McEwen, supra note 205, at 238 (citing DNA TECHNOLOGY IN
FORENSIC SCIENCE (1995)).
216 Only four states (Indiana, IND. CODE § 10-1-9-18 (Burns 2000); New York,
N.Y. EXEC. § 995-d (McKinney Supp. 2001); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.5-
10(2)(d) (2000); and Wyoming, WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-19-404(c) (Lexis 2001)) currently
prohibit forensic DNA samples to be used to derive health information. Ohio allows its
data bank to be used in proceedings establishing paternity or maternity. OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 109.573 (1997). New Jersey and Maryland allow access to the data bank
to determine parentage if there is a court order. MD. CODE ANN., art. 88B, § 12A(K)(iv);
MD. CODE ANN. FAMILY LAW § 5-1029 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:17-52, 53:1-20.21
(2000). See LORI ANDREWS & DOROTHY NELKIN, BODY BAzAAR: THE MARKET FOR
HUMAN TISSUE IN THE BIOTECHNOLOGY AGE 121, 123 (2001). Twenty states permit the
use of samples for research. Kimmelman, supra note 14, at 212.
217 See 28 C.F.R. Part 46 (2000) (Department of Justice regulations applicable
to research, which would apply to research conducted by a federally-funded state crime
laboratory or its designee).
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interest but research, except research incident to data
bank quality assurance, would not meet this burden.
8. Scope of data bank - DNA data banks should be limited
to DNA obtained from individuals convicted of violent
sex offenses and other violent felonies. For these
offenders, the magnitude of the crime, concerns about
recidivism, and the likelihood of having DNA evidence
at a subsequent crime scene outweigh their privacy
interests in not having to submit a DNA sample. The
original legislative enactments were wise in limiting
DNA samples to this class of felons. Excitement about
the law enforcement potential of wider sampling should
not be permitted to dominate policy development.
State legislatures throughout the country are debating
the issue of where to draw the lines in mandating that
offenders be included in state forensic DNA data banks. There
are many possible categories: violent felons, all felons, all
convicts, all arrestees, and the general population. We reject
the notion of including all arrestees or everyone, and we
believe that limiting the class -of individuals to violent felons is
the most defensible demarcation.218
218 Professor Kaye asserts that requiring a national data base will benefit
minority suspects because inmate-based data banks are skewed on the basis of race
and ethnicity to reflect the higher minority inmate population. He further suggests
that a national data base will eliminate the need for police to round up large numbers
of minority men (and women) to search for suspects. Kaye, supra note 200, at 194-98.
It is difficult to embrace Professor Kaye's unsupported speculation that
members of minority groups, justifiably distrustful of both the law enforcement and
biomedical research communities, would consider the mass collection, analysis, and
retention of their DNA as a way of protecting their civil rights. In our view, dragnet
searches of minority populations to generate suspects are unconstitutional under Davis
v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969), and should be prohibited. Without the outrage of
such searches, Professor Kaye's "equality" argument in favor of a national data bank
collapses. It is not necessary to know the identity of the perpetrator to exonerate an
innocent person charged with the crime. Indeed, it is the lack of a match between crime
scene DNA and the individual charged with the crime, not that someone else's DNA
matched the evidence, that has led to the release of wrongfully convicted individuals.
Professor Kaye has a very powerful, simple argument that he comes close to
obfuscating. The intrusions on civil liberties that would occur with a more
comprehensive or a national forensic DNA data base are outweighed by the public
interest in law enforcement. Kaye, supra note 200, at 191. It is an argument that will
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9. Sanctions for violations - Federal law provides for a
$100,000 fine for the unauthorized disclosure of
information in a law enforcement data bank,219 but most
states do not provide for any sanctions.2 1 All
jurisdictions should provide for legal sanctions to deter
the unauthorized access to or use of data bank
information.
CONCLUSION
In disparate areas of daily life too numerous to mention,
the DNA revolution has been thrust upon society so quickly
that often there has not been adequate opportunity for
reflection. Law enforcement is no exception. In a few years'
time, DNA evidence has become admissible in every
jurisdiction in the United States, and it is often compelling
evidence of guilt or innocence. With computer data bases of
previously analyzed and personally identified DNA samples, it
is easy to determine the source of DNA samples left at crime
scenes by previously unknown culprits. The temptation to
include in law enforcement DNA data banks more samples
from more individuals-or all individuals-is alluring. Yet,
sweeping sample collection strategies, requiring law abiding
citizens, suspects, and convicts alike to submit DNA for use by
the criminal justice system may be going too far. As Illinois
Supreme Court Justice Walter Schaefer wrote: "The quality of
a nation's civilization can be largely measured by the methods
it uses in the enforcement of its criminal law."
221
Balancing the interests in expanded forensic DNA data
banks is extremely complicated. On one side are the appealing
and concrete-if difficult to quantify-benefits of preventing
and solving a range of crimes. On the other side are abstract
have wide appeal. We applaud the goal; we just think that such a data base raises
grave constitutional issues and, even if constitutional, the civil liberties cost is too
high.
219 42 U.S.C. § 14133(c) (1999).220 See infra Appendix, Tbl. 1.
221 Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 26 (1956) (quoted in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 480 (1966)).
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interests in the freedom to be left alone from governmental
demands for bodily specimens. One may question how
individuals are harmed by submitting a DNA sample for use in
law enforcement identification. The same could be said for
mandatory submission of fingerprints, photographs,
handwriting samples, voice exemplars, urine samples, and hair
samples. Would there be any harm if the government
demanded that every individual submit all of these samples?
Although some people might view the cumulative demands as
establishing a closer case, this is still the wrong question. The
essence of the Fourth Amendment (and the more general
principle of personal privacy) is to establish a sphere of
inviolability surrounding the individual. The real question,
then, is whether the government interest is so compelling as to
overcome the presumption that the autonomy, dignity, and
physical integrity of the individual should not be disturbed.
The issue of forensic DNA data banks does not arise in a
vacuum. In the emerging world of electronic communications,
biotechnology, and computerization, important social questions
are continually emerging regarding privacy, confidentiality,
and anonymity. A major source of legislative activity at both
the federal and state levels involves determining the
appropriate degree of privacy protection for medical
information, credit information, consumer information,
personal data, and numerous other bits of information. In
Whalen v. Roe,222  the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of a state computer bank containing the
records of prescriptions for Schedule II drugs. Justice Brennan
wrote in his concurrence:
[C]ollection and storage of data by the State that is in itself
legitimate is not rendered unconstitutional simply because new
technology makes the State's operations more efficient. However, as
the example of the Fourth Amendment shows, the Constitution puts
limits not only on the type of information the State may gather, but
also on the means it may use to gather it. The central storage and
easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increase the potential
for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say that
future developments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb
on such technology.=
429 U.S. 589 (1977).
Id. at 606-07 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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Despite the dazzling and often befuddling new
technology, the issue is simply how to utilize new technology in
a way consistent with societal values. Our society and laws
have dealt with the issue before, and it is something that
undoubtedly will arise repeatedly in the future. There is,
inevitably, a tradeoff between law enforcement and civil
liberties. The promise of new technology in aid of law
enforcement is seductive; yet, the constitutionally protected
sphere of privacy, once breached, will not be easily restored.
The celebrated case of Olmstead v. United States24
raises issues analogous to those we see today with DNA law
enforcement data banks. In Olmstead, a majority of the
Supreme Court held that the strictures of the Fourth
Amendment did not apply to the new technology of wiretapping
because, in the majority's view, the Fourth Amendment applied
only to physical invasions of one's person or property, a
position since repudiated by the Supreme Court.2'
Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead is legendary, and
it rings true today. Brandeis believed that the Constitution is a
"living document," and the law should view new technologies in
light of the underlying constitutional values they implicate.
"Time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and
purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be capable of
wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.""6 To
Brandeis, it was absolutely essential for the Fourth
Amendment to be construed broadly and applied to new
technology that could not have been anticipated by the framers
of the Constitution. 7
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness .... They conferred, as against
the Government, the right to be let alone, the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that
224 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
2 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 473-74 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
227 "One of Brandeis's working folders for Olmstead contains a 1928 clipping
reporting on the development of something called television. Brandeis was a great
believer in progress-but not all progress was good." PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D.
BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 325 (1984)(footnote omitted).
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right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.=
In a frequently quoted passage, Brandeis eloquently
addressed the issue of whether the infringement upon Fourth
Amendment rights is justified by the government interest in
law enforcement and protecting the safety and security of the
citizenry.
And it is also immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of- law
enforcement. Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to
protect liberty when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men
born to freedom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty
by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without
understanding.
229
Today, there is great zeal to broaden the scope of law
enforcement DNA data banks. We should resist the temptation
to extend the scope of data banks beyond criminals convicted of
violent felonies. Furthermore, other measures outlined in this
Article, including analyzing only non-coding regions of DNA,
destroying samples after analysis, prohibiting uses beyond law
enforcement identification, and providing substantial penalties
for violations of the law, are necessary to ensure that liberty is
not ensnared by a dragnet of DNA.
277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id. at 479 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). In his dissent
in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Association, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), Justice
Marshall expressed a similar concern. "History teaches that grave threats to liberty
often come in times of urgency, when Constitutional rights seem too extravagant to
endure .... [Wihen we allow fundamental freedoms to be sacrificed in the name of
expediency, we invariably come to regret it." Id. at 634 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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